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An Uncertain Prescription—Medical Malpractice
Actions in Louisiana
INTRODUCTION
Terry Warren died on October 12, 2000, as a result of heart
problems while undergoing treatment.1 Although Mr. Warren’s
widow and one daughter asserted wrongful death and survival
actions against the treating physicians, the other daughter was not
allowed to do so because the prescriptive period had expired by the
time her claims were asserted.2 According to the Louisiana
Supreme Court, the general codal rules of interruption of
prescription do not apply in medical malpractice actions.3 This
interpretation allows for the possibility that a wrongful death
claimant’s action can prescribe before it ever accrues, even if the
victim of malpractice timely files suit before his death, leaving the
wrongful death plaintiff with no chance at a remedy.4
In 1975, the Louisiana Legislature passed what is commonly
known as the Medical Malpractice Act in an effort to curtail rising
medical costs and insurance rates.5 Louisiana Revised Statutes
sections 40:1299.41–.49 set forth the procedure by which medical
malpractice actions must be asserted.6 Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 9:5628 governs the prescriptive period for such actions.7
Perceived conflicts between the Medical Malpractice Act and
the Louisiana Civil Code challenge Louisiana courts, which have
wrestled with the suspension of prescription provided by Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 40:1299.47 and the interruption of
prescription provided by the Civil Code.8 The challenges lie in
Copyright 2012, by DANIEL A. KRAMER.
1. Warren v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 21 So. 3d 186, 203 (La. 2009).
2. Id. at 203, 206–08.
3. Borel v. Young, 989 So. 2d 42, 67 (La. 2008).
4. Wrongful death and survival actions do not accrue until the death of the
decedent. See Taylor v. Giddens, 618 So. 2d 834, 840 (La. 1993); discussion
infra Part II.B.3.
5. Louisiana Revised Statutes sections 40:1299.41–.49 are commonly
known under the name “the Medical Malpractice Act.” In addition, section
9:5628 is often included under the umbrella of “the Act.” The policies behind
the Medical Malpractice Act were described in Kandy G. Webb, Comment,
Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation—A First Checkup, 50 TUL. L. REV.
655, 666 (1976).
6. See Taylor, 618 So. 2d at 841.
7. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5628 (2007).
8. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Lafayette Bone & Joint Clinic, 467 So. 2d 113
(La. Ct. App. 3d. 1985), overruled by LeBreton v. Rabito, 714 So.2d 1226 (La.
1998); Taylor, 618 So. 2d 834; LeBreton, 714 So. 2d 1226; Borel, 989 So. 2d
42; Warren v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 21 So. 3d 186 (La. 2009).
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determining (1) whether suspension of prescription provided in
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 40:1229.47 should preempt the
general rules of prescription found in the Louisiana Civil Code; (2)
whether such preemption should extend to barring relation back of
amended petitions; and (3) whether the prescriptive period for
wrongful death claims is governed by Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 9:5628 or Louisiana Civil Code article 3492.9
This Comment explores a line of cases, including LeBreton v.
Rabito, Borel v. Young, and Warren v. Louisiana Medical Mutual
Insurance Co., and suggests an alternative interpretation that
would lead to results more in line with the general rules of
prescription set forth in the Louisiana Civil Code.10 Part I provides
a background in this area of the law by reviewing pertinent statutes
and principles of Louisiana procedure. Part II analyzes the
reasoning of the cases in question and criticizes certain decisions.11
It also contrasts application of current law with an alternative
suggested by the analysis. Part III concludes the comment, briefly
outlining suggestions designed to eliminate the unfair procedural
bar created in LeBreton, Borel, and Warren. The judge-made
barrier of uninterruptible prescription in medical malpractice cases
is bad medicine for Louisiana’s codal command, whereby the
person at fault must repair the damage he has caused.12
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Medical Malpractice Act
The Louisiana Legislature passed the Medical Malpractice Act13
amid a trend of increasing numbers of medical malpractice claims
9. Compare Taylor, 618 So. 2d at 841 (holding that Louisiana Civil Code
article 3492 governs the prescriptive period for wrongful death in medical
malpractice actions), with Warren, 21 So. 3d at 207–08 (applying the
prescriptive period set forth Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:5628 to a
claim of wrongful death arising in medical malpractice).
10. LeBreton, 714 So. 2d 1226; Borel, 989 So. 2d 42; Warren, 21 So. 3d 186.
11. The primary cases examined are LeBreton v. Rabito, 714 So. 2d 1226
(La. 1998); Borel v. Young, 989 So. 2d 42 (La. 2008); and Warren v. La. Med.
Mut. Ins. Co., 21 So. 3d 186 (2009).
12. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (2010).
13. Louisiana Revised Statutes sections 40:1299.41–.49 are commonly
known as the Medical Malpractice Act, but the discussion herein will be
confined mostly to Act No. 808, 1975 La. Acts 1860 (enacting Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 9:5628), and Act No. 817, 1975 La. Acts 1875
(enacting Louisiana Revised Statutes sections 40:1299.41–.49), which were
enacted to slow the growth of rising medical costs. See E. Scott Hackenberg,
Comment, Puttering About in a Small Land: Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5628
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and higher damages awards, which consequently led to higher
malpractice insurance costs and higher medical costs for patients.14
The Act was a compromise between the public good, represented by
lower medical costs and increased access to medical care, and the
private harm of limiting actions in malpractice.15
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 40:1299.47 requires that all
malpractice claims against qualified health care providers, other
than those submitted for binding arbitration, must be reviewed by a
medical review panel (MRP).16 The MRP procedure serves as an
inexpensive way to filter out spurious medical malpractice
claims.17 Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:5628 provides a
prescriptive period of one year from the date of the commission or
discovery of the alleged malpractice on actions for damages
against health care providers.18 However, “in all events such

and Judicial Responses to the Plight of the Medical Malpractice Victim, 50 LA.
L. REV. 815, 815–16 (1990); see also Webb, supra note 5, at 666.
14. Webb, supra note 5, at 658-59.
15. Crier v. Whitecloud, 496 So. 2d 305, 308–9 (La. 1986) (citing Webb,
supra note 5); Hackenberg, supra note 13, at 815–16; Marc S. Firestone,
Comment, Prescription—What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You—Louisiana
Adheres to a Three Year Limit on the Discovery Rule, 58 TUL. L. REV. 1547,
1553 n.40 (1984).
16. Louisiana Revised Statutes section 40:1299.47 provides: “All
malpractice claims against health care providers covered by this Part, other than
claims validly agreed for submission to a lawfully binding arbitration procedure,
shall be reviewed by a medical review panel established as hereinafter provided
for in this Section.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(A)(1)(a) (Supp. 2011).
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 40:1299.42 provides the requirements for
qualification under the Act, which include filing proof of financial responsibility
with the Patient’s Compensation Fund Oversight Board and payment of a
surcharge. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §40:1299.42 (Supp. 2011).
17. Webb, supra note 5, at 681. Negative review panel findings do not bar
subsequent court claims. Id.
18. Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:5628 provides:
No action for damages for injury or death against any [listed health care
provider], hospital or nursing home . . . arising out of patient care shall
be brought unless filed within one year from the date of the alleged act,
omission, or neglect, or within one year from the date of discovery of
the alleged act, omission, or neglect; however, even as to claims filed
within one year from the date of such discovery, in all events such
claims shall be filed at the latest within a period of three years from the
date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5628(A) (2007). The three year “outside limit” is a
codification of the “discovery doctrine,” known in Louisiana and civil law
jurisdictions as contra non valentem, short for contra non valentem agere nulla
currit praescriptio, which means “prescription does not run against a party
unable to act.” Hebert v. Doctors Mem’l Hosp., 486 So. 2d 717, 721 n.7 (La.
1986). Despite the text of Louisiana Civil Code article 3467, “[p]rescription runs

490

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

claims shall be filed at the latest within a period of three years
from the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect.”19 The filing
of a request for an MRP review of a claim suspends the time
within which a suit must be instituted until 90 days after the
plaintiff (or her attorney) receives notification of the issuance of
the MRP’s opinion.20
From the inception of the Medical Malpractice Act, courts and
commentators debated whether the periods during which a claim
arising from medical malpractice must be filed were prescriptive or
peremptive.21 Eventually, the Louisiana Supreme Court held in
Hebert v. Doctors Memorial Hospital that both the one-year and
three-year periods were prescriptive in nature.22 The differences
between the effects of prescription and peremption in medical
malpractice suits, important in Hebert, were minimized by the
holdings of Borel and Warren, which attributed one of the major
effects of peremption to the Medical Malpractice Act—the
holdings barred interruption of prescription.23

against all persons unless exception is established by legislation[,]” Louisiana
courts apply the doctrine to suspend prescription where a person is unable to act.
See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 3467 cmt. d (2011); Corsey v. State Department of
Corrections, 375 So. 2d 1319 (La. 1979).
19. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5628(A) (2007).
20. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) (Supp. 2011). For purposes
of brevity, the time at which notification of the issuance of the MRP’s opinion is
received by the plaintiff or his attorney will be referred to throughout this
Comment as “after the MRP opinion,” or by other similar language.
21. Hackenberg, supra note 13, at 819; see, e.g., Borel v. Young, 989 So. 2d
42, 64 (La. 2008) (on rehearing, finding the period is prescriptive); Borel, 989
So. 2d at 51 (on original hearing) (“[W]e find [section 9:5628] establishes a
peremptive time period.”); Hebert, 486 So. 2d at 724 (“[W]e conclude that
[Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:5628] is in both of its features . . . a
prescription statute . . . .”); FRANK L. MARAIST & THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR.,
LOUISIANA TORT LAW 236 (1996) (“The statute contains both a one-year
prescriptive period (including a codified discovery rule) and what seems to be a
three-year peremptive period.”).
22. See Hebert, 486 So. 2d 717; see also Warren v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co.,
21 So. 3d 186, 205 (La. 2008) (expressing approval of the Hebert and Borel
(rehearing) holdings that the periods are prescriptive).
23. This point was candidly expressed in a footnote in Warren, 21 So. 3d at
205 n.3. By refusing to apply interruption of prescription or relation back of an
amended petition, the court caused the prescriptive period to resemble a
peremptive period, which cannot be interrupted and has been found to forbid
relation back. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3461 (2007) (“Peremption may not
be renounced, interrupted, or suspended.”); see also Naghi v. Brener, 17 So. 3d
919, 925 (La. 2009) (plurality opinion written by Victory, J.) (forbidding
relation back because of its interference with the operation of peremption and
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B. Liberative Prescription and Peremption
Louisiana Civil Code articles 3445 through 3472 delineate the
differences between liberative prescription and peremption.24
Liberative prescription bars actions because of a plaintiff’s inaction.25
On the other hand, “[p]eremption is a period of time fixed by law for
the existence of a right.” 26 Unless the right is exercised before the end
of the peremptive period, it is extinguished.27 Although liberative
prescription merely prevents enforcement of a right of action,
peremption actually destroys the right.28
While prescription can be interrupted or suspended, peremption
may not.29 The interruption of prescription is the wellspring from
which the decisions in LeBreton, Borel, and Warren flow. The
Louisiana Supreme Court decided all of these cases on the basis
that the claims had prescribed because interruption was not
applicable in the area of medical malpractice.30
C. Interruption and Suspension of Prescription
When prescription is interrupted, the prescriptive “clock” starts
over again after the interruption ends.31 For example, if a

the peremptive destruction of the right of action). The Louisiana Supreme Court
later limited Naghi to its facts in Scaglione v. Juneau, 40 So. 3d 127 (La. 2010).
In his 2010 article for the Louisiana Bar Journal, Professor Crawford colorfully
referred to the “doctored-up” prescriptive nature of such statutes as section
9:5628: “Put lipstick on prescription and it is still prescription.” William E.
Crawford, Peremption and Legal Malpractice: Does Civil Code Article 2315
Create Rights Subject to Peremption?, 58 LA. B. J. 24, 25 n.5.
24. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 3445–72 (2007). While there are a number of
differences, only those relevant to the issues discussed in this comment are set
forth here.
25. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3447 (2007).
26. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3458 (2007).
27. Id.
28. Id. cmt. b (citing Pounds v. Schori, 377 So. 2d 1195, 1198 (La. 1979)).
29. Liberative prescription can be interrupted by filing suit or service of
process, LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3462 (2007), or by acknowledgment, LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 3464 (2007). Prescription can be suspended by statute. See, e.g.,
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3469 (2007). Louisiana courts have also recognized the
jurisprudential doctrine of contra non valentem, which suspends prescription.
Peremption is not subject to suspension or interruption. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
3461 (2007).
30. See infra Part II.A–B.
31. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3466 (2007) (“If prescription is interrupted, the
time that has run is not counted. Prescription commences to run anew from the
last day of interruption.”).
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prescriptive period of one year is interrupted on the 300th day,
when the interruption terminates the prescriptive period remaining
is 365 days. A common example of interruption occurs when a suit
is filed in a court of competent jurisdiction and proper venue; it
continues as long as the suit remains pending.32 The interruption of
prescription is effective against all solidary obligors (and their
successors) and in favor of “several parties [who] share a single
cause of action.”33
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 40:1299.47 provides that
the running of prescription against all joint and solidary obligors,
and joint tortfeasors, is suspended by the filing of a request for a
review of a medical malpractice claim with the division of
administration.34 However, the effect of suspension of prescription
differs from interruption in that the period of suspension is merely
“not counted toward [the] accrual of prescription.”35
When suspension of prescription ends, the clock does not start
over; it begins to run again from where it paused.36 In contrast with
the example of interruption above, if a prescriptive period of one
year is suspended on the 300th day, when the suspension is over
the prescriptive period remaining is 65 days.
Liberative prescription, a product of Roman law, is grounded
in the belief that it contributes to the stability of society by putting
an end to litigation and reducing the uncertainty of the debtor.37
32. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 3462 and 3463 (2007).
33. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1799 (2008) (interruption against one solidary
obligor is effective against the other solidary obligors); Williams v. Sewerage &
Water Bd. of New Orleans, 611 So. 2d 1383, 1390 (La. 1993) (where because a
widow’s suit for compensation benefits interrupted prescription, and she shared
a cause of action (wrongful death) with her children, the children were entitled
to interruption of prescription). In the context of interruption of prescription, a
cause of action is the “juridical facts which constitute the basis of the right.”
Benoit v. Allstate Ins. Co., 773 So. 2d 702, 706 (La. 2000); see also Louviere v.
Shell Oil Co., 440 So. 2d 93, 95 (La. 1983).
34. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) (Supp. 2011). The
suspension of prescription provided for in section 40:1299.47 continues until 90
days after notification to the claimant or his attorney of the MRP’s opinion, id.
at (A)(2)(a), the claim is dismissed in accordance with the section, id. at
(A)(2)(c), or the panel is dissolved in accordance with the section, id. at (B)(3).
35. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3472 (2007).
36. See id.
37. Patrick D. Gallaugher, Jr., Comment, Revision of the Civil Code
Provisions on Liberative Prescription, 60 TUL. L. REV. 379, 380 (1985).
“Without [prescription] there would be no security in transactions, no stability in
private estates, no peace among individuals, no order in the state.” 5 G. BaudryLacantinerie & Albert Tissier, Traité Théorique Et Pratique De Droit Civil,
Prescription, in CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS 18, No. 29 (La. St. Law Inst. trans.,
1972) (4th ed. 1924). Specifically, liberative prescription is based on a
presumption of payment. Id. at 21, No. 32. Liberative prescription was meant to
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The purpose of interruption of prescription is “to fix the rights of
the parties at the time prescription is interrupted . . . .”38 The
purpose of suspension of prescription is to provide “a measure of
equity” to a plaintiff who is prevented by law or circumstances
from interrupting prescription.39 This effect ensures that everyone
has the same prescriptive period during which they can assert their
rights.40
Despite the public policy benefits of prescription, when a party
amends his pleadings and does not enjoy the benefits of
interruption or suspension of prescription, the “preference [of the
law] for resolving disputes on their merits” will sometimes allow
the “relation back” of the amendments.41
D. Relation Back of Amended Pleadings
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1153 controls the
relation back of amended pleadings.42 Relation back allows the
assertion of claims or defenses in an amended pleading that
otherwise would have prescribed.43 Generally, if a pleading is
amended after the prescriptive period has run, it will relate back to
the timely filing of the original pleading if “the action or defense
asserted [by the amendment] arises out of the conduct, transaction,

protect a debtor from having to pay a debt twice due to loss of the evidence of
payment; “prescription will substitute for the missing document.” Id. at 17, No.
27. “[A defendant] ought not to be called on to resist a claim when ‘evidence has
been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.’”
Developments in the Law—Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185
(1950) (quoting Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321
U.S. 342, 349 (1944)).
38. In re Noe, 958 So. 2d 617, 632 (La. 2007). Once an obligor has
acknowledged his debt or been sued (either of which interrupt prescription, see
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 3463 & 3464 (2007)), there is no reason to think he
will be “uncertain” with respect to his obligation, and such acknowledgment or
suit provides the obligor with adequate notice to preserve any proofs he might
have with respect to payment.
39. See, e.g., Corsey v. State Dept. of Corrections, 375 So. 2d 1319, 1321
(La. 1979) (recognizing the doctrine of contra non valentem); 1 MARCEL
PLANIOL, TRAITÉ ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL Part 2, at 594, No. 2698 (La. St.
Law Inst. trans., 1959) (12th ed. 1939).
40. PLANIOL, supra note 39 at 594, No. 2698.
41. See Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A., 130 S.Ct. 2485, 2494 (2010).
42. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1153 (2005).
43. See, e.g., Ray v. Alexandria Mall, 434 So. 2d 1083, 1086 (La. 1983)
(relation back removes the grounds for the peremptory exception of
prescription); Naghi v. Brener, 17 So. 3d 919, 925 (La. 2009) (relation back
avoids the operation of prescription).
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or occurrence set forth . . . in the original pleading.”44 The
Louisiana Supreme Court interpreted the broad language of article
1153 in Ray v. Alexandria Mall and Giroir v. South Louisiana
Medical Center and established criteria for adding or substituting
defendants and plaintiffs.45 The court recognized that article 1153
was modeled after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), and that
its “doctrinal commentaries and judicial interpretations are
strongly persuasive as to the meaning and application of the
Louisiana article.”46 The United States Supreme Court recently
found that the purpose of relation back is “to balance the interests
of the defendant protected by the statute of limitations with the
preference expressed in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
general, and Rule 15 in particular, for resolving disputes on their
merits.”47
The general rules of prescription and relation back, while
acting to balance the interests of the public, defendants, and
plaintiffs, seem somewhat academic in light of recent Louisiana
medical malpractice jurisprudence. In the line of cases beginning
44. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1153 (2005).
45. Both cases created criteria founded on a balance between the preference
for having suits decided on the basis of their merits as opposed to technical
mistakes, and a desire to refrain from prejudicing the defense. Ray, 434 So. 2d at
1086–87 (establishing criteria for adding defendants); Giroir v. South La. Med.
Ctr., 475 So. 2d 1040, 1044 (La. 1985) (establishing criteria for adding
plaintiffs). It is worthwhile to note in passing that the facts of Giroir sounded in
medical malpractice, with the plaintiffs making wrongful death and survival
claims.
Under the circumstances of this case, no essential protective purpose of
the prescriptive statute is violated by permitting relation back of the
post prescription amendment based on the same factual situation
pleaded in the original timely petition. . . . The fundamental purpose of
prescription statutes is only to afford a defendant economic and
psychological security if no claim is made timely, and to protect him
from stale claims and from the loss of non-preservation of relevant
proof.
Girior, 475 So. 2d at 1045. Although the claims were rooted in medical
malpractice, analysis of the prescriptive statutes in the case was not considered
from within the context of Louisiana Revised Statutes sections 9:5628 and
40:1299.47. Therefore, the Court may have neglected to consider the
prescriptive policy concerns which many courts and commentators have
attributed to the statutes—namely that of reducing the cost of health care and
medical malpractice insurance by limiting the period in which claims may be
filed, and through the institution of an MRP “filter” for claims. See, e.g., Webb,
supra note 5, at 666; Firestone, supra note 15, at 1553 n.40. This policy concern
is discussed infra Part II.B.3.
46. Giroir, 475 So. 2d at 1042 (citing Ray, 434 So. 2d at 1083).
47. Krupski v. Costa Cociere S.p.A.,130 S.Ct. 2485, 2494 (2010). The
Court also held that relation back under Rule 15 does not depend on the
amending party’s timeliness in seeking to amend the pleading. Id. at 2490.
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with LeBreton v. Rabito, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that
the general rules of interruption of prescription (including relation
back) do not apply in the area of medical malpractice.48
II. ANALYSIS
This Part shows how the Louisiana Supreme Court’s broad
application of the LeBreton rule, which was intended to be limited
in its application, creates unjust results. Unfortunately for those
with certain wrongful death and survival claims, the court’s refusal
to apply interruption of prescription and relation back in medical
malpractice actions means they may be unable to enforce their
rights.
A. An Ounce of Prescription Is Worth a Pound of Cure—LeBreton
Should Be Limited to its Facts
In LeBreton, the court held the general codal rules of
interruption did not apply in an action arising in medical
malpractice when suit had been filed before receipt of the MRP’s
opinion.49 The court explained that the general codal rules of
interruption of prescription conflicted with suspension provided in
the Medical Malpractice Act.50 The Borel court declined to limit
LeBreton to its facts, extending it to a situation where suit was
properly filed after receipt of the MRP’s opinion.51
1. Only a Premature Suit Creates a Conflict
Diana LeBreton filed a wrongful death claim in district court
against three doctors on August 18, 1992 (for their actions on
August 18, 1991, alleged to have caused her father’s death).52 On
August 19, 1992, she filed a request for review of her claim by an
MRP.53 The doctors filed dilatory exceptions of prematurity, which
were granted by the district court in July and August of 1993.54
48. Warren v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 21 So. 3d 186, 206–08 (2009).
49. LeBreton v. Rabito, 714 So. 2d 1226, 1230–31 (La. 1998).
50. Id. at 1227.
51. See Borel v. Young, 989 So. 2d 42, 67 (La. 2008).
52. LeBreton, 714 So. 2d at 1227.
53. Id.
54. Id. The basis of the dilatory exception of prematurity was that the suit
was filed before notice of the MRP opinion was sent to the plaintiff. See id. at
1229–30. As a result, the suit was dismissed without prejudice. Id. The dilatory
exception “retards the progress of the action,” but does not generally defeat it.
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 923 (2005). The effect of sustaining a dilatory
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The MRP sent its finding of no medical malpractice to the
plaintiff’s attorneys on August 14, 1996.55 Then, on February 3,
1997, the plaintiff again filed suit for wrongful death against the
doctors.56
The trial court used the reasoning supplied in Hernandez v.
Lafayette Bone & Joint Clinic57 to support a decision overruling
the defendants’ peremptory exceptions of prescription.58
Hernandez contained facts similar to LeBreton.
In Hernandez, the alleged malpractice began on January 4,
1980, and remained undiscovered until March 16, 1981.59 The
plaintiff filed a medical malpractice lawsuit in district court on
March 15, 1982, and requested an MRP on March 22, 1982.60 A
few months later, sustaining the defendants’ dilatory exceptions of
prematurity, the court dismissed the suit without prejudice, as
required by Louisiana Revised Statutes section 40:1299.47.61 The
MRP notified the plaintiff of its opinion on August 12, 1983.62 The
plaintiff then filed a second suit against all defendants on
December 16, 1983, which the trial court deemed prescribed.63
It was undisputed that the first suit was filed timely.64 The
Third Circuit Court of Appeal applied Louisiana Civil Code article
3463 and its comment (b), finding that prescription had been
interrupted continuously by the first suit and began to run anew
upon the suit’s dismissal, “unless something had happened in the
meanwhile to again prevent the running of prescription.”65 But, the

exception of prematurity is dismissal without prejudice. LA. CODE CIV. PROC.
ANN. art. 933 (2005); see also id. cmt. c.
55. Id. at 1227.
56. Id.
57. Hernandez v. Lafayette Bone & Joint Clinic, 467 So. 2d 113 (La. Ct.
App. 3d 1985).
58. LeBreton, 714 So. 2d at 1227.
59. Hernandez, 467 So. 2d at 114.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 114–15. Article 3463 provides:
An interruption of prescription resulting from the filing of a suit in a
competent court and in the proper venue or from service of process
within the prescriptive period continues as long as the suit is pending.
Interruption is considered never to have occurred if the plaintiff
abandons, voluntarily dismisses the action at any time either before the
defendant has made any appearance of record or thereafter, or fails to
prosecute the suit at the trial.
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court reasoned that something did happen to prevent the running of
prescription—suspension of prescription triggered by the request
for the MRP review.66
By this method, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal applied
suspension and interruption of prescription simultaneously.67 This
allowed a plaintiff who filed a premature medical malpractice suit
to gain an additional year of prescription to file his suit anew, in
addition to the suspension provided by the Medical Malpractice
Act.68
In LeBreton, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that a patient
must request and receive the opinion of an MRP before an action is
commenced in a court of law.69 Recognizing that section
40:1299.47 provides for the suspension of prescription during the
MRP’s review of the claim,70 the court found that “the legislature
by special provision for the inclusion of suspension excluded the
applicability of interruption of prescription.”71 Justice Knoll wrote
for the majority: “[C]onsidering the doctrinal underpinnings for the
existence of the rules of suspension, it is evident that there is no
need for the general rules of interruption of prescription to
combine with suspension to synergistically benefit the plaintiff.”72
The court further explained that its ruling served the judicial
system by eliminating the advantage afforded to plaintiffs who fail
to follow the proper medical malpractice litigation procedure.73 It
reversed the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal’s decision denying the
doctors’ peremptory exception of prescription.74
Based on the structure and language of the opinion, the court’s
disapproval of an advantage given to prematurely filing plaintiffs

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3463 (2007). “[I]f an interruption results and the action
is dismissed without prejudice, the period during which the action was pending
does not count toward the accrual of prescription. The plaintiff then has the full
prescriptive period within which to bring a new action.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN.
art. 3463 cmt. b (2007).
66. Hernandez, 467 So. 2d at 115.
67. See LeBreton v. Rabito, 714 So. 2d 1226, 1229 n.6 (La. 1998)
(“Plaintiff has conceded that she can only defeat defendants’ peremptory
exception of prescription if she can simultaneously take advantage of
interruption and suspension of prescription.”).
68. Id. at 1230.
69. Id. (citing Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256 (La. 1978)).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1231.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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was only a secondary reason for its holding in LeBreton.75 The
primary reason was a perceived conflict between Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 40:1299.47 and the general codal rules of
prescription.76
The court held that section 40:1299.47 only suspends the time
within which a suit must be instituted when a request for review by
an MRP is made.77 The court reasoned that if Louisiana Civil Code
articles 3466 and 3472 applied, then the suspension and
prescription provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act would “be
written out.”78
The LeBreton court recognized that a request for review by an
MRP and receipt of an opinion must be made and obtained before
a claimant can properly file in a court of law.79 Upon timely
request for review by an MRP, Louisiana Revised Statutes section
40:1299.47 provides that prescription is suspended during the
75. The structure and language of the opinion point to the application of the
rules of statutory construction as the primary basis for the holding and the
dislike of unfair advantage to prematurely filing plaintiffs as secondary. An
example of the language indicative of this assertion is, “[w]e further find that
our ruling also serves the judicial system by eliminating an advantage which
Hernandez granted to those litigants who failed to follow the proper procedural
sequence in medical malpractice litigation.” LeBreton, 714 So. 2d at 1231.
Assuming the truth of the previous assertion, it remains that a substantial
proportion of the opinion was devoted to the development of the reasoning
behind the secondary argument.
76. LeBreton, 714 So. 2d at 1229.
77. Id. at 1229–30.
78. Id. at 1230. Justice Knoll took the time to comment in a footnote, “[a]s
regards the non-qualified health care provider and cases not involving medical
malpractice, [Louisiana Civil Code article 3462], the general provision, provides
for interruption of prescription.” Id. at 1231 n.7. This dictum is partially belied
by Justice Knoll’s own reasoning. In cases of medical malpractice:
[t]he filing of a request for a review of a claim shall suspend the
running of prescription against all joint and solidary obligors, and all
joint tortfeasors, including but not limited to health care providers, both
qualified and not qualified, to the same extent that prescription is
suspended against the party or parties that are the subject of the request
for review.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) (2008) (emphasis added). If
application of the general rules of prescription conflicts with the statute when
applied to the qualified class of defendants, it should also conflict when applied
to the other. The footnote’s assertion is only supported if the reason a conflict
exists is the necessity of the MRP review of medical malpractice claims against
the qualified health care provider. The lack of necessity of review for the nonqualified tortfeasor means suspension of prescription is not necessary, allowing
the inference that interruption of prescription against them is appropriate. Justice
Knoll’s dictum was implicitly followed in Coleman v. Acromed Corp., 764 So.
2d 81 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
79. LeBreton, 714 So. 2d at 1230–31.
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panel’s review and until 90 days following the plaintiff’s (or his
attorney’s) receipt of notification of the panel’s opinion.80
Allowing interruption of prescription by a premature suit before
and during the panel’s review would render the suspension of
prescription provided by section 40:1299.47 ineffective, or at least
subvert the purpose behind the Act by providing additional time to
file.81
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 40:1299.47 contains a
provision that was discussed only briefly in the LeBreton majority
opinion, where the court stated that “[n]o action against a health
care provider covered by this Part, or his insurer, may be
commenced in any court before the claimant’s proposed complaint
has been presented to a medical review panel established pursuant
to this Section.”82 The statute forbids the suspension or interruption
of prescription by filing a request for review with any “entity”
other than the division of administration.83 This provides a ready
means for harmonizing the general rules of prescription with the
Medical Malpractice Act. It is precisely the means favored by the
LeBreton majority: a suit to enforce rights arising from medical
malpractice in district court, filed before receipt of notification of
an MRP’s opinion, does not interrupt prescription.84
The proper way to begin asserting a medical malpractice claim
is by a request for an MRP review with the division of
administration, for which the plaintiff is provided with the
“measure of equity” of suspension of prescription.85 It makes no
80. Id. at 1230.
81. See id. This is an instance where Louisiana Revised Statutes section
9:5628 is considered as part of the Medical Malpractice Act.
Dissenting in LeBreton, Chief Justice Calogero wrote that the provisions of
the statutes in question were not in conflict, “as both provisions can easily be
harmonized with the result of each provision being given full effect.” LeBreton,
714 So. 2d at 1232 (Calogero, C.J., dissenting). Noting that section 40:1299.47
provides only a suspensive period, that article 3462 provides only for
interruption of prescription, and neither contain ambiguous language about
suspension or interruption of prescription, he opined that Louisiana Civil Code
article 9 forbade further interpretation in search of the intent of the legislature.
Chief Justice Calogero essentially favored the Hernandez interpretation of the
statutes, which he wrote “clearly harmonizes the two provision[s] at issue[.]” Id.
at 1233. He asserted that such a result was “mandated by the long-standing
jurisprudential rule [that w]here there are two permissible interpretations of a
prescriptive statute, the courts must adopt the one that favors maintaining rather
than barring the action.” Id. (citing Foster v. Breaux, 270 So. 2d 526 (La.
1972)).
82. Id. at 1230; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(B)(1)(a)(i) (2008).
83. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) (2008).
84. See LeBreton, 714 So. 2d at 1230–31.
85. Id. at 1230.
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sense to provide the plaintiff with a more effective “remedy”
(interruption of prescription) when he has not properly begun to
assert his claim than the “remedy” provided (suspension) when a
claimant has proceeded according to the dictates of the statute.86
2. LeBreton Broadened: A New Prescription for Medical
Malpractice
In the Borel case, the plaintiffs timely requested an MRP
review of their malpractice claim against a medical center and two
doctors.87 After receipt of the MRP’s opinion, the plaintiffs timely
filed suit against only the medical center.88 Later, plaintiffs filed
similar claims in a separate lawsuit against the doctors, alleging
solidary liability with the medical center.89 The doctors argued the
claims against them had prescribed.90 In response, the plaintiffs
argued that their suit against the medical center had interrupted
prescription against the doctors.91
The Borel plurality relied primarily on LeBreton’s holding that,
“considering the doctrinal underpinnings for the existence of the
rules of suspension, it is evident that there is no need for the
general rules of interruption of prescription to combine with
suspension to synergistically benefit the plaintiff.”92 However,
there is no such synergy when the plaintiff files suit after receiving
notice of the MRP’s opinion, as in Borel.93
A narrow view of LeBreton would bar interruption only on suits
filed before receipt of the MRP opinion.94 Nothing in LeBreton
indicates that the general codal rules of prescription conflict with
provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act after receipt of the MRP
opinion. The broadest statement in LeBreton is: “[w]e . . . find[] that
the specific statutory provision providing for the suspension of
prescription in the context of medical malpractice should have been
applied alone, not complementary to the more general codal article
86. The proper “remedy,” of course, being suspension of prescription. See
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) (2008).
87. Borel v. Young, 989 So. 2d 42, 45 (La. 2008).
88. Id.
89. Id. The lawsuits were eventually consolidated. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 67 (on rehearing) (quoting LeBreton v. Rabito, 714 So. 2d 1226,
1231 (La. 1998)).
93. Id. at 45 (on original hearing).
94. The narrow interpretation of LeBreton was expressed succinctly as “a
medical malpractice suit, filed prior to the request for a medical review panel,
does not interrupt prescription on a medical malpractice claim.” Farve v. Jarrott,
886 So. 2d 594, 596 (La. App. Ct. 2004).
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which addresses interruption of prescription.”95 This finding
expressly envisions the complementary application of suspension
and interruption of prescription; however, in the time period
following notification of the MRP’s opinion, the claimant does not
have the advantage of both suspension and interruption. After the
notification, upon filing suit, the plaintiff enjoys interruption only.
For example, if a plaintiff filed suit on the day after he received
notification of the medical board’s opinion, he would theoretically
enjoy 89 more days of suspension of prescription—but to what
effect? After filing suit, prescription is continuously interrupted.96
The greater effect has subsumed the lesser with no complementary
or synergistic effect. The 89 days will expire and prescription will
remain under continuous interruption because of the pending
lawsuit.97
The Borel opinion acknowledged factual differences from
LeBreton but declared, without further analysis (except for citing
facts and analysis from Richard v. Tenet Health Systems, Inc.98):
[O]ur holding in LeBreton clearly stands for the principle
that medical malpractice claims are governed by the
specific provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act
regarding suspension of prescription, to the exclusion of the
general codal articles on interruption of prescription. That
holding is broad enough to extend to the instant case.99
95. LeBreton, 714 So. 2d at 1226.
96. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3463 (2007).
97. See id. It must be stated, though, that should the suit be dismissed
without prejudice for any reason before the expiration of the 90 day period of
suspension, interruption of prescription should be ineffective, for the same
reasons it was in LeBreton. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
98. Richard v. Tenet Health Systems, Inc., 871 So. 2d 671 (La. Ct. App.
2004). The Richard opinion briefly cited LeBreton in a footnote for the
proposition that the general rules of prescription do not apply in cases governed
by the Medical Malpractice Act. Richard, 871 So. 2d at 673, n.1. Richard
presented virtually no analysis on the subject other than its citation to LeBreton.
Furthermore, the facts of Richard are readily distinguishable from those of
Borel. In Richard, an MRP considered complaints against one group of
defendants, but not a second group. Richard, 871 So. 2d at 672–73. The plaintiff
timely filed suit against the defendants the MRP had considered, and later
requested an MRP to consider claims against the second group. Id. The court
held that the suit against the first group did not interrupt prescription against the
second group, against whom the request for an MRP was untimely made. Id. at
674. Essentially, the suit was premature with respect to the second group of
defendants, putting the Richard facts within the scope of a narrow view of the
LeBreton holding; therefore, even a broadened view of the LeBreton holding in
Richard was not necessary to the decision and was obiter dictum.
99. Borel, 989 So. 2d at 67.
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Justice Weimer did not explain why the holding was broad
enough to extend to the facts of Borel. Perhaps the court should
have provided reasons why the narrower view was impermissible,
given the jurisprudential rule favoring maintaining an action in the
face of a prescriptive statute with two permissible
interpretations.100 Because prescriptive periods are founded on
public policy and in derogation of individuals’ rights, they are
stricti juris and “must come clearly under specific provisions of the
law.”101 Although the plurality did not extend prescription where
none existed under the statute, it refused to apply interruption of
prescription where the statute was silent about it. Thus, the above
rule applies by analogy.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeal had similarly adhered to a
broad interpretation of the LeBreton holding in its hearing of
Borel.102 The court quoted language from LeBreton, omitting
words indicating that the holding might be restricted to the facts of
the case:
[B]y virtue of the legislative enactment calling for the
necessity of a medical review panel prior to submission of
the case to the district court, the legislature by special
provision for the inclusion of suspension excluded the
applicability of interruption of prescription. . . .
100. Foster v. Breaux, 270 So. 2d 526, 529 (La. 1972). It should be noted
that a commentator criticized the rule as “dangerous because judges are resistant
to changes in the law and tend to use [the] canon to preserve old laws at the
expense of new ones, thus undermining legislative supremacy.” Nadia N. San
Miguel, Note, Taylor v. Giddens: Louisiana Supreme Court Tailors Medical
Malpractice Statute, 39 LOY. L. REV. 699, 704–05 (1993–94). “As stated in
former article 20 of the [Louisiana] Civil Code, ‘[t]he distinction of laws into
odious laws and laws entitled to favor, with a view of narrowing or extending
their construction, can not [sic] be made by those whose duty it is to interpret
them.’” Id. at 705 (explaining that while former article 20 is no longer in effect,
it is still authoritative as a corollary to legislative supremacy). Here, where the
language of the statute itself was seen as clear and unambiguous (at least by
Chief Justice Calogero, see LeBreton, 714 So. 2d at 1232 (Calogero, C.J.,
dissenting)), application of the rule in question, far from “narrowing or
extending [its] construction,” would merely preserve the statute as written,
which contains no references to the barring of interruption of prescription
except: “Filing a request for review of a malpractice claim as required by this
Section with any agency or entity other than the division of administration shall
not suspend or interrupt the running of prescription.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) (2008).
101. Meyer v. Parish of Plaquemines, 11 So. 2d 291, 296 (La. 1942)
(refusing to extend prescription by analogy).
102. Borel v. Young, 947 So. 2d 824, 829 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2006), aff’d,
989 So. 2d 42 (La. 2007).
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Thus, considering the doctrinal underpinnings for the
existence of the rules of suspension, it is evident that there
is no need for the general rules of interruption of
prescription to combine with suspension to synergistically
benefit the plaintiff.103
However, the passage from LeBreton actually begins: “In the
present case, by virtue of the legislative enactment . . .”104 The
Third Circuit Court of Appeal provided no additional analysis or
reasons why it thought the holding should be interpreted broadly.
The Louisiana Supreme Court’s Borel plurality opinion cited
Richard v. Tenet Health Systems, Inc. for support of the broad view
of LeBreton.105 Richard cited “LeBreton and the cases following
it” (neglecting to cite any specific cases) to support the broad
view.106 But, an extensive review of the cases following LeBreton
and preceding Borel (both the Third Circuit Court of Appeal and
Louisiana Supreme Court decisions) revealed no cases giving
reasons for a broad interpretation of the LeBreton holding.107 Only
three cases appeared to follow such an interpretation: Yen v.
Avoyelles Parish Police Jury,108 Borel (Third Circuit Court of
Appeal opinion), and Borel (Louisiana Supreme Court opinion).
Yen was decided after Borel (Third Circuit) and was not cited in
Borel (Louisiana Supreme Court).109
103. Id. at 829–30.
104. LeBreton v. Rabito, 714 So. 2d 1226, 1230 (La. 1998) (emphasis
added).
105. Borel v. Young, 989 So. 2d 42, 67–68 (La. 2008); Richard v. Tenet
Health Systems Inc., 871 So. 2d 671 (La. Ct. App. 2004).
106. Richard, 871 So. 2d at 673, n.1.
107. One case of note arose: Yen v. Avoyelles Parish Police Jury, 971 So. 2d
536, 539 (La. Ct. App. 2007), which cites the Third Circuit Court of Appeal’s
hearing of Borel for the broadened LeBreton holding but provides no additional
analysis or reasons. Other cases either referred to the LeBreton holding in the
narrow sense, or in the broad sense but had facts similar to LeBreton, where the
plaintiff had filed prematurely in a court of law and either never requested an
MRP review or did so after filing in court. See, e.g., LaCoste v. Pendleton
Methodist Hosp., L.L.C., 947 So. 2d 150 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (referring to the
LeBreton holding in the narrow sense); Metro. Dev. Ctr. v. Liner, 891 So. 2d 62
(La. Ct. App. 2004) (referring broadly to the holding but with roughly the same
pertinent facts as LeBreton). Borel (Third Circuit Court of Appeal and Supreme
Court), Yen, and Warren appear to be the only cases which assert the broad
interpretation of the LeBreton holding and have facts that make the holding
necessary to reach the desired result; none explained reasons for the expansion
of LeBreton.
108. 971 So. 2d 536 (La. Ct. App. 2007); see also supra note 107.
109. Borel (Third Circuit) was decided December 29, 2006 and Yen was
decided December 5, 2007.
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Concurring in the result of Warren, Justice Knoll discussed
with seeming displeasure the broadening of the LeBreton holding,
which she herself had authored: “The holding in LeBreton did not
exclude the application of the general provisions on interruption of
prescription in medical malpractice cases in other instances, just to
the situation where the plaintiff sought to benefit by the
simultaneous application of the interruption and suspension
provisions.”110
When a suit is filed timely, after notification of an MRP’s
opinion, there is no conflict between the general rules of
interruption of prescription and Louisiana Revised Statutes section
40.1299.47. It is the simultaneous and complementary application
of suspension and interruption of prescription that creates the
conflict recognized in LeBreton. Lacking such a conflict,
interruption of prescription is presumably permissible. The Borel
plurality opinion provided no reasons or persuasive authority to
support its broad interpretation of LeBreton. Given the rule
favoring maintenance of actions when two permissible
interpretations of prescriptive statutes exist, the adoption of the
broad view of the LeBreton holding is questionable.111 Borel gave
Louisiana medical malpractice defendants a new prescription: an
uninterruptible period designed to cure the ill of rising medical
costs.
B. “Take two aspirin and call me in the morning”—the Louisiana
Supreme Court Takes LeBreton Two Steps Further
Borel put a stop to interruption of prescription against solidary
tortfeasors—suit filed against one tortfeasor will not interrupt
prescription against another solidarily liable tortfeasor, such as an
employer.112 Warren went two steps further: it disallowed
interruption in favor of plaintiffs who share the same cause of
action and prevented relation back of amended pleadings.113 These
are hard pills to swallow for some wrongful death and survival
claimants.

110. Warren v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 21 So. 3d 186, 218 (La. 2009) (Knoll,
J., concurring in result).
111. “Under Louisiana jurisprudence, prescriptive statutes are strictly
construed, and of two permissible constructions that is adopted which favors
maintaining rather than barring the action.” Foster v. Breaux, 270 So. 2d 526,
529 (La. 1972).
112. See Borel v. Young, 989 So. 2d 42, 45, 67 (La. 2008).
113. Warren, So. 3d 186, 206–08 (La. 2009) (on rehearing).
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1. Interruption of Prescription in Warren Would Not Have
Created a Conflict
On October 13, 2000, Terry Warren passed away while under
the care of “various health care providers.”114 After receiving the
required MRP opinion, Pamela and Theresa Warren, Terry’s
widow and daughter, timely filed suit against the defendants on
November 25, 2002. Sarah Warren, Terry’s other daughter, was
aware of the suit but chose not to join as a plaintiff.115 On July 6,
2004, the plaintiffs amended their petition, adding Sarah as a
plaintiff with survival and wrongful death claims.116 The
defendants filed a peremptory exception of prescription with
respect to Sarah’s claims, arguing that her claims had
prescribed.117 The defendants further argued that relation back was
not proper because Sarah chose not to participate until she realized
she might be called as a witness, and that the defendants would be
prejudiced if a new plaintiff were added nearly three years after the
request for an MRP’s opinion.118
On original hearing the court cited Williams v. Sewerage &
Water Board of New Orleans for the principle that when several
parties share the same cause of action, interruption of prescription
in favor of one is effective in favor of the other.119 Applying this
principle, the court found that prescription with respect to Sarah
Warren’s survival action was interrupted when her mother and
sister filed suit.120
Writing for the plurality on rehearing, Justice Victory first
applied the broad interpretation of the LeBreton holding, citing
Borel and distinguishing Williams:
Williams was not a medical malpractice action. For had it
been a medical malpractice action, Borel would dictate that
the specific provisions of the Act apply to the exclusion of
the general code articles on interruption of prescription
against solidary obligors, just as the specific provisions of
the Act regarding suspension of prescription applied to the
114. Id. at 203.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 188–89 (on original hearing).
120. Id. at 189 (on original hearing). The Court analyzed the prescription of
the survival and wrongful death claims separately—the survival claim in an
interruption of prescription framework and the wrongful death claim in a
relation back framework. See id.
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exclusion of the general code article on interruption of
prescription against joint tortfeasors in Borel.121
Finding its original decision contrary to Borel, and rejecting
Williams’s application in the area of medical malpractice, the
plurality found Sarah Warren’s survival claim had prescribed.122
The Warren case is factually distinguishable from the LeBreton
case. In LeBreton, the plaintiff filed her petition in court before
requesting an MRP;123 but in Warren, the plaintiffs filed after
receiving the opinion of an MRP.124 In short, the plaintiff’s suit
was premature in LeBreton but not in Warren. It is true that
Williams was not a medical malpractice case.125 However, the rules
of interruption of prescription as applied therein create no conflict
with the suspension of prescription provisions of the Medical
Malpractice Act for the same reasons outlined above.126 Because
there is no conflict, there is no reason to prevent the operation of
the general rules of prescription in a medical malpractice lawsuit
where suit is timely filed and not premature.
Lacking such a conflict, there was no reason the court should
have ignored the rule favoring the maintenance of actions in the
face of ambiguous prescription statutes.127 At least, the plurality
gave no reason—nor did it provide any reasons in support of the
broad interpretation of LeBreton other than its references to
Borel.128 Moreover, the plurality was not content to find only one
claim prescribed. It continued to stretch LeBreton to hold that
relation back is inapplicable in medical malpractice actions.129
121. Id. at 207 (on rehearing).
122. Id.
123. LeBreton v. Rabito, 714 So. 2d 1226, 1227 (La. 1998).
124. Warren, 21 So. 3d at 203.
125. Id. at 207–08. Williams v. Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans
was a wrongful death and survival case alleging negligence outside the medical
malpractice context. 611 So. 2d 1383, 1385–86 (La. 1993).
126. Cf. supra Part II.A.1–2.
127. Foster v. Breaux, 270 So. 2d 526, 529 (La. 1972).
128. Warren, 21 So. 3d at 206–07. Justice Knoll, concurring in result only
with the Borel plurality opinion (on rehearing) wrote:
In its criticism of the majority opinion on original hearing, the plurality
opinion now cites to the principles of jurisprudence constante in its
refusal to overrule the Hebert holding as to the three-year provision.
However, jurisprudence constante does not give the Court license to
perpetuate error as we are bound under our Constitution and the Civil
Code to uphold and abide by the law.
Borel v. Young, 989 So. 2d 42, 81 (La. 2008) (citing James L. Dennis,
Interpretation and Application of the Civil Code and the Evaluation of Judicial
Precedent, 54 LA. L. REV. 1, 10 (1993)).
129. See Warren, 21 So. 3d at 207.
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2. Relation Back of Amended Petitions Creates No Conflict
The Warren plurality viewed relation back of an amended
petition as a way to “directly avoid[] the application of prescription
by allowing a claim which would have otherwise prescribed to
proceed.”130 Justice Victory perceived a conflict between relation
back of the amended petition and the suspension provisions of the
Medical Malpractice Act.131 However, if there is no conflict with
respect to interruption of prescription and the Act, there should be
no conflict with relation back if its purpose is to avoid the
application of prescription.132
Correct application of civil law principles leads to the
conclusion that relation back should be allowed. The Civil Code
contains the general rules of suspension and interruption of
prescription.133 Louisiana Revised Statutes sections 9:5628 and
40:1299.47 are special statutes acting as exceptions to the general
rules found in the Civil Code.134 Under civilian methodology, if a
general statute grants a right limited by a special statute, the special
statute should be interpreted restrictively.135 This means the scope
of the special statute providing the exception “may not be enlarged
by analogy.”136 The Warren plurality’s reliance on an analogy
between interruption of prescription and relation back violates this
principle.137
A restrictive interpretation of the LeBreton holding removes
the specter of conflict between the Medical Malpractice Act and
the general rules of prescription when suit is filed after the MRP
opinion is received. It is therefore difficult to imagine a conflict
between the Medical Malpractice Act and the relation back effect
of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1153—after all, the
Act is silent with respect to amended petitions and relation back.138
Justice Weimer explained, concurring in the original hearing:
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Cf. supra Part II.A.
133. See discussion supra Part I.B–C.
134. See Warren, 21 So. 3d at 205; discussion supra Part II.A.
135. Olivier Moréteau, An Introduction to Contamination, 3 J.C.L.S. 9, 13
(2010). Here, the right granted is interruption of prescription under Louisiana
Civil Code article 3462.
136. Id.
137. See Warren, 21 So. 3d at 207–08 (where the plurality applies its
analogy between interruption of prescription and relation back).
138. Warren, 21 So. 3d at 197 (on original hearing, Weimer, J., concurring).
The Act is also silent with respect to interruption of prescription, except for the
following sentence: “Filing a request for review of a malpractice claim as
required by this Section with any agency or entity other than the division of
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[W]here there is no conflict between the general codal
articles and the specific provisions of the Medical
Malpractice Act, the various provisions should be read in
conformity with each other. Thus, because the Medical
Malpractice Act is silent as to the relation back of pleadings
adding an additional claim and/or plaintiff, there is no bar
to applying [Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article]
1153 in this case.139
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1153 “does not
operate here simply to ‘get around medical malpractice
prescription.’”140 Justice Weimer noted that the purpose of
prescriptive statutes was to provide economic and psychological
security and protect against stale claims and losses due to lack of
preservation of proof.141 “Not one of those goals is undermined by
[relation back,]” he wrote.142 Justice Weimer also reasoned that the
Giroir factors ensured the defendants knew or should have known
about the claims within the prescriptive period and were not
prejudiced in their defense.143
The plurality was concerned that “the application of [Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure article 1153] ‘would potentially subject a
health care provider to an indefinite period of prescription, . . . a
result clearly at odds with the purpose of the [Act].’”144 This is
certainly a valid concern, but as Justice Weimer reasoned, the
factors set forth in Ray v. Alexandria Mall and Giroir v. South
Louisiana Medical Center protect this interest.145 This is especially

administration shall not suspend or interrupt the running of prescription.” LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) (2008).
139. Warren, 21 So. 3d at 197 (on original hearing, Weimer, J., concurring).
140. Id. (apparently quoting Justice Victory’s dissenting opinion at 21 So. 3d
at 198 (on original hearing)).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 207 (on rehearing, citing Borel v. Young, 989 So. 2d 42 (La.
2008)).
145. Id. at 197 (on original hearing, Weimer, J., concurring); see Ray v.
Alexandria Mall, 434 So. 2d 1083, 1086–87 (La. 1983) (adding claims against
new defendants); Giroir v. S. La. Med. Ctr., Div. of Hosp, 475 So. 2d 1040,
1044 (La. 1985) (adding claims by new plaintiffs). The factors were designed to
ensure defendants had adequate notice of claims and were not prejudiced in their
defense. The Giroir factors are:
(1) [T]he amended claim arises out of the same conduct, transaction, or
occurrence set forth in the original pleading; (2) the defendant either
knew or should have known of the existence and involvement of the
new plaintiff; (3) the new and the old plaintiffs are sufficiently related
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true when considered in light of Warren’s facts—the suit was filed
after receipt of the MRP’s opinion.146 The original majority and
concurring opinions agreed that Sarah Warren’s wrongful death
claim should relate back to the timely filing of the other plaintiffs’
petition.147 Chief Justice Calogero featured the four Giroir factors
prominently in his analysis, finding all four factors satisfied.148
The second Giroir factor is applied to ensure defendants have
adequate notice of claims brought against them.149 The MRP
review warns the qualified health care provider of such claims.150
After all, the nature of the review is to determine whether the
qualified health care provider met the applicable standard of
care.151 Implicit in the review is the idea that the qualified provider
is aware that a party is likely to assert a claim of medical
malpractice against him.
The value of this warning can be effectively expressed through
an example. A medical malpractice claimant requests review of his
claim by an MRP and then later timely files suit against both a
non-qualified tortfeasor and a health care provider qualified under
the Act.152 The qualified health care provider had earlier notice
(through the medical review process) than the non-qualified
tortfeasor. If the justification for relation back depends on the
interest of defendants in having adequate notice of the claims
against them, there is theoretically more reason to allow relation

so that the added or substituted party is not wholly new or unrelated;
(4) the defendant will not be prejudiced in preparing and conducting his
defense.
Giroir, 475 So. 2d at 1044.
146. Warren, 21 So. 3d at 203 (on rehearing).
147. Id. at 187, 194, 197. Chief Justice Calogero wrote for the majority on
original hearing; Justices Kimball and Weimer concurred.
148. Id. at 189–94 (Calogero, C.J., on original hearing). Only the second and
third factors are discussed here.
149. See id. at 192–93.
150. In addition, the panel’s review itself extends for an indefinite period. In
Warren, the time between the request for review and receipt of the panel’s
opinion was just under one year. 21 So. 3d at 187. In Borel v. Young, the time
period was approximately one year and five months. 989 So. 2d 42, 45 (La.
2008). In LeBreton v. Rabito, the time period was nearly four years. 714 So. 2d
1226, 1227 (La. 1998).
151. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(G) (2008).
152. Under Borel, interruption of prescription occurs with respect to the nonqualified tortfeasor but not the qualified health care provider. See Borel, 989 So.
2d at 67; LeBreton,, 714 So. 2d at 1230, n.7.
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back against the qualified health care provider than against the
non-qualified tortfeasor.153
On original hearing, the court found that the second factor was
satisfied because the facts indicated the defendants had knowledge
of the involvement of the new plaintiff at the time the original suit
was filed.154 Similarly, when a qualified health care provider has
knowledge of possible survival and wrongful death plaintiffs,
relation back should be allowed.
Sarah Warren, as a survival and wrongful death plaintiff, had a
legal identity of interest with the original plaintiffs through
operation of Louisiana Civil Code articles 2315.1 and 2315.2.155
This point, which was not discussed by the court in the context of
the third Giroir factor, is nonetheless important to the analysis of
interruption of prescription. Requiring a close relationship and
identity of interests with the original plaintiff ensures the purposes
of the prescriptive statute with respect to defendants are not injured
by allowing interruption of prescription in favor of the new
plaintiff.156 On rehearing, Justice Victory reasoned that relation
back operated as a way to avoid prescription.157 But, if the
prerequisites for interruption of prescription are satisfied through
notice and identity of interest, then prescription is not being
avoided, but only “bridged” by notice and knowledge. Holding
otherwise leads to the undesirable result that plaintiffs’ wrongful
death and survival actions can prescribe before they ever accrue.158
The analysis above shows that the interests of defendants are
protected by application of the Giroir factors. However, the
plurality opinion on rehearing found that relation back thwarted the
153. See Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 130 S.Ct. 2485, 2494 (2010)
(“[T]he purpose of relation back[] [is] to balance the interests of the defendant
protected by the statute of limitations with the preference expressed in . . . Rule
15 . . . for resolving disputes on their merits.”); Ray v. Alexandria Mall,, 434 So.
2d 1083, 1085 n.5 (La. 1983) (referring to “fair notice” as a reason for allowing
relation back and listing “notice of the institution of the action that he will not be
prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits” as a factor in whether to
allow relation back against new defendants); Giroir v. S. La. Med. Ctr., Div. of
Hosp., 475 So. 2d 1040, 1043 (La. 1985).
154. Warren, 21 So. 3d at 192 (on original hearing).
155. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2315.1 (Survival action) and 2315.2
(Wrongful death action) (2010).
156. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Theriot, 376 So. 2d 950, 954 (La. 1979) (“None
of these basic prescriptive values are offended when a subsequent claimant,
closely connected in relationship and interest to the original plaintiff, enters the
timely-filed suit to assert a claim based upon the same factual occurrence as that
initially pleaded.”).
157. Warren, 21 So. 3d at 207.
158. See infra Part II.B.3.
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special prescriptive purposes of the Act.159 A look at the purpose of
the Medical Malpractice Act shows the error of this view.
3. Interruption and Relation Back Do Not Offend the Purpose
of the Statute
The Medical Malpractice Act may differ in one respect from
other prescriptive statutes—it was passed as a response to an
urgent and specific need to stabilize medical costs.160 At the time
of its passage there was great concern in many states about the
rising cost of malpractice insurance.161 An open-ended prescriptive
period (such as provided through an unlimited discovery doctrine)
increased the cost of insurance premiums because the policies were
traditionally written on an “occurrence” basis.162 The term
“occurrence” is a bit ambiguous. It means “the commission of an
act, error or omission or the date of discovery thereof or the date of
injury caused thereby.”163 Open-ended discovery periods result in
inaccurate rate setting because an occurrence under the policy
might occur long after the year for which the rate was set.164 This
uncertainty required insurance companies to keep larger reserves,
leading to higher rates, which in turn lead to higher overall medical
costs.165 Thus, the Act has a public purpose which may be stronger
(or at least more specific) than that of other prescriptive statutes.
This public purpose is not harmed by allowing relation back or
interruption of prescription. In order for relation back or
interruption of prescription to operate, a suit must first be timely
filed. Allowing interruption of prescription or relation back with
respect to a previously filed claim does not create a new
occurrence because the existence of an occurrence is independent
of claims filed against the insured.166 Therefore, the chain of
uncertainty leading to higher medical costs is not aggravated by
159. Warren, 21 So. 3d at 207.
160. Firestone, supra note 15, at 1560.
161. Id.
162. Id. With an occurrences policy, the peril insured is the “occurrence,” or
act of malpractice. Hood v. Cotter, 5 So. 3d 819, 826 (La. 2008). Once the
occurrence happens, coverage attaches even though a claim has not been made.
Id. But with a “claims made” policy, the peril insured is the making of the claim.
Id.
163. Anderson v. Ichinose, 760 So. 2d 302, 305 (La. 1999).
164. See Firestone, supra note 15, at 1560.
165. Id.
166. See Anderson, 760 So. 2d at 305 (“Once the ‘occurrence’ takes place,
coverage attaches even though the claim may not be made for some time
thereafter.”).
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allowing interruption of prescription or relation back, meaning the
public interests behind the Act are not harmed.
LeBreton recognized Taylor v. Giddens as determining that the
prescriptive period for wrongful death claims is not set forth in
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:5628 but in Louisiana Civil
Code article 3492.167 The references by both Justice Victory in
Warren and Justice Weimer in Borel to the “purpose of the [Act]”
may have been misplaced.168 Louisiana Revised Statutes sections
40:1299.41–.49 do not establish a prescriptive period; they govern
the procedure by which medical malpractice claims must be
asserted and provide for suspension of prescription during and
shortly after an MRP’s deliberations.169 Unless one includes
section 9:5628 under the label of “the Act,”170 which might be
reasonable because both cover the same general subject matter, one
cannot honestly say that the purpose of the Act was to “curtail
lengthy periods for filing malpractice suits by limiting application
of the discovery rule of contra non valentem to a maximum of
three years.”171 Rather, the purpose of the act (applicable to
167. LeBreton v. Rabito, 714 So. 2d 1226, 1229 (La. 1998); see LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 3492 (2011) (“Delictual actions are subject to a liberative
prescription of one year.”). In Taylor v. Giddens, Justice Ortique wrote:
The determination that the prescriptive period for wrongful death
actions arising from acts of medical malpractice are not within the
scope of [Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:5628], does not alter the
affect [sic] that the Medical Malpractice Act . . . has on wrongful death
actions. The actions continue to be governed and procedurally
controlled by the provisions of the Act. Rather, because [section]
9:5628 does not provide the prescriptive period for wrongful death
actions, the commencement and running of its prescriptive period is
controlled by the one year liberative period applicable to delictual
actions, [Louisiana Civil Code article] 3492, and the action is available
to the certain beneficiaries named in [Louisiana Civil Code article]
2315.2 (formerly named in [Louisiana Civil Code article] 2315).
Taylor v. Giddens, 618 So. 2d 834, 841 (La. 1993).
168. Warren v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co. 21 So. 3d 186, 207 (La. 2009)
(quoting Borel v, Young, 989 So. 2d 42, 68 n.12 (alterations in original)). Also,
in LeBreton, the Court was concerned with a plaintiff gaining an advantage by
flaunting the MRP procedure. See LeBreton, 714 So. 2d at 1230. It seems
obvious in that case that the purpose of section 40:1299.47 would have been
subverted had the plaintiff been allowed to prevail but less so in Borel and
Warren where the MRP procedure was properly followed.
169. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) (Supp. 2011).
170. The author notes that section 9:5628 was passed separately from
sections 40:1299.41–.47. The former was passed under 1975 La. Acts, No. 808
whereas section 40:1299.47 was enacted under 1975 La Acts. No. 817. See LA.
REV. STAT ANN. § 9:5628 (2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47 (Supp.
2011).
171. Borel, 989 So. 2d at 68 n.12.
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prescription in wrongful death cases) was simply the purpose
behind prescriptive statutes in general.172
Nevertheless, the Warren case involved a wrongful death claim
governed by the prescriptive period of Louisiana Civil Code article
3492.173 Presumably, the purpose of article 3492 in relation to
wrongful death claims is the same as it is for every other general
delictual claim, since that is the subject matter of the article.174
Because the relation back of general delictual claims under Ray
and Giroir presumably does not offend the purpose of article 3492,
it should not have been so held in Warren.
Application of Warren could lead to the unjust result of a right
of action for wrongful death prescribing before it ever accrues.175
An action for wrongful death does not arise until a victim dies.176
Even if the victim timely files suit for his or her own damages and
then dies after the three-year limit of Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 9:5628, Warren seems to indicate that the spouse’s or
children’s wrongful death claim will have already prescribed and
any amendment adding such a claim will not be allowed to relate
back.177 This seems to be a type of injustice article 1153 was
designed to prevent, and it is precisely the injustice the Taylor v.
Giddens court contemplated when it wrote, “[s]uch a result is
intolerable, as it discriminates among wrongful death tort
claimants.”178
Perhaps unsatisfied with simply eliminating interruption of
prescription and barring relation back of amended pleadings in the
medical malpractice context, Justice Victory reiterated from Borel
that “we find that any general codal article which conflicts with
these provisions may not be applied to such actions in the absence of
specific legislative authorization in the Act. The Act has no rules
allowing relation back of pleadings for medical malpractice
claims.”179 Here, a provision with no analogue in the Medical

172. See supra Part I.C.
173. Warren, 21 So. 3d at 203; Taylor v. Giddens, 618 So. 2d 834, 841 (La.
1993).
174. See LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 3492 (2011). See supra Part I.C. for a
discussion of the purpose of liberative prescription.
175. See Taylor, 618 So. 2d at 841; Walls v. Am. Optical Corp., 740 So. 2d
1262, 1273–74 (La. 1999); see also Hackenberg, supra note 13, at 838–40.
176. Walls, 740 So. 2d at 1273.
177. See Warren, 21 So. 3d at 207–08.
178. Taylor, 618 So. 2d at 841 (referring to discrimination between those
victims who die before the three-year limit of section 9:5628 and those who die
after).
179. Warren, 21 So. 3d at 207.

514

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

Malpractice Act was held to be in conflict.180 The extension of this
logic makes it difficult to predict what other statutes are in conflict
with the Act.181 For example, does Warren mean that
acknowledgment of the obligation does not interrupt prescription?182
The Act appears silent with respect to acknowledgment of medical
malpractice obligations, save possibly in the case of waiver of the
requirement for an MRP, where suspension continues for 90 days
past the dismissal of the panel.183 Application of the Warren holding
would seem to foreclose interruption by acknowledgment even
when suspension of prescription ends 90 days after the panel issues
its opinion.
Without adequate explantion or justification, Warren further
expanded LeBreton to block both interruption of prescription with
respect to a plaintiff sharing the same cause of action and relation
back of an amendment to a timely filed petition. This is two steps
past the already untenable position of Borel. Moreover, the
application of what seems to be the incorrect statute to the
wrongful death claim in Warren created uncertainty where none
should exist.184
C. What Are the Side Effects? A Comparative Analysis
The following hypothetical scenarios demonstrate the manner
in which a narrow interpretation of LeBreton harmonizes the
general rules of interruption of prescription with the suspension
provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act, leading to just results.
They also bring to light the unjust and presumably unintended
consequences of the current broad view of LeBreton.

180. Id. The provision in question was Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
article 1153.
181. See id. at 209 (on rehearing, Johnson, J., dissenting).
182. “Prescription is interrupted when one acknowledges the right of the
person against whom he had commenced to prescribe.” LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art.
3464 (2007). “Louisiana jurisprudence is settled that an acknowledgment
interrupting liberative prescription may be oral or written, formal or informal,
and express or tacit.” Id. at cmt. e.
183. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(A)(2)(c) (Supp. 2011).
184. Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:5628 as opposed to Louisiana Civil
Code article 3492. It should be noted that Warren has been seen to have implicitly
overruled Taylor. Guy v. Brown, 67 So. 3d 704, 706 (La. Ct. App. 2011).
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1. Suit Against Non-Qualified Tortfeasor Before MRP Reviews
Claim Against Qualified Health Care Provider
Plaintiff Paul is injured in an auto accident caused by Tom and
treated in a hospital where he believes he has suffered medical
malpractice at the hands of qualified health care provider Dr.
Quentin. Paul files suit against both Tom and Dr. Quentin, and
later timely requests review of his claim against Dr. Quentin by an
MRP.
Under a narrow interpretation of LeBreton, prescription against
Tom is interrupted because the claim against him does not arise in
malpractice.185 However, prescription against Dr. Quentin is only
suspended during the panel’s review and for 90 days thereafter.186
Interruption with respect to Dr. Quentin occurs only if Paul brings
suit against him between the time notification of the panel’s
decision is received and the end of the prescriptive period.187
Because interruption of prescription does not take place until after
the MRP procedure, Paul receives no synergistic application of
both suspension and interruption of prescription, which seemingly
was the court’s desired result in LeBreton.188
Under the broad interpretation espoused in Borel, Paul cannot
enjoy interruption of prescription or relation back against Dr.
Quentin under any circumstance.189 Even if the MRP reviewed
claims against other solidary obligors qualified under the medical
malpractice act (such as Dr. Quentin’s employer), Paul will be
unable to amend his timely filed petition against Dr. Quentin to
include claims against Dr. Quentin’s employer once the
prescriptive period has run.190 This result flies in the face of
Louisiana Civil Code article 2315, which calls for those at fault to
repair damages they have caused.191

185. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3462 (2007).
186. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) (Supp. 2011); LeBreton
v. Rabito, 714 So. 2d 1226, 1230–31 (La. 1998).
187. See discussion supra Part II.A.1–2.
188. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
189. See Borel v. Young, 989 So. 2d 42, 67 (La. 2008); Warren v. La. Med.
Mut. Ins. Co., 21 So. 3d 186, 207–08 (La. 2009); see also discussion supra Parts
II.A–B.
190. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
191. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (2010).
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2. Suit Filed After MRP Procedure Is Complete
Here, Paul files a request for review of his medical malpractice
claim against Dr. Quentin before filing suit against Dr. Quentin
and Tom.
The narrow view of LeBreton would allow interruption of
prescription against both Dr. Quentin and Tom because Paul
waited until his claim against Dr. Quentin was mature.192 After
Paul receives notification of the MRP’s opinion, interruption of
prescription should be allowed because the greater effect of
interruption subsumes the lesser effect of suspension.193
Furthermore, allowing interruption against Dr. Quentin is
reasonable because he received earlier notice of the claim than
Tom, against whom interruption is allowed.194 Should Paul die as a
result of the medical malpractice after the prescriptive period
expires, Paul’s son Paul Jr. will not be prevented from asserting
wrongful death and survival claims against Dr. Quentin through
operation of prescription.195 This does not harm the state’s interests
in a limited discovery period because allowing interruption and
relation back does not create uncertainty with respect to
occurrences.196
The broad view of LeBreton refuses to apply interruption of
prescription against Dr. Quentin and in favor of Paul Jr. regardless
of whether the suit against the doctor complied with the MRP
requirement.197 This is despite the lack of conflict in this situation
between suspension of prescription provided in section 40:1299.47
and interruption provided in the Civil Code.198 Should Paul die as a
result of the medical malpractice after the prescriptive period has
expired, Paul Jr. will be barred from asserting wrongful death and
survival claims against Dr. Quentin because the claims prescribed
before they accrued.199
192. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3462 (2007); see also discussion supra Part
II.A.1.
193. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
194. See discussion supra Part II.B.3. Dr. Quentin received earlier notice
than Tom as a result of the MRP procedure, which occurred before the suit was
filed. Interruption of prescription is allowed against the non-qualified tortfeasor.
See Coleman v. Acromed Corp., 764 So. 2d 81, 84 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
195. See discussion supra Part II.B.1–3.
196. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
197. See Borel v. Young, 989 So. 2d 42, 67 (La. 2008); Warren v. La. Med.
Mut. Ins. Co., 21 So. 3d 186, 207–08 (La. 2009); see also discussion supra Parts
II.A–B.
198. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
199. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
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3. Suit Is Premature with Respect to One Qualified Health
Care Provider but Not the Other
Here, Paul is treated by two qualified health care providers, Dr.
Quentin and Dr. Quick. Paul was unconscious when Dr. Quick was
operating on him and did not realize he was involved until later.
Paul requested a review of his claim of malpractice against only
Dr. Quentin by an MRP. After receiving notification of the panel’s
opinion, Paul timely files suit against Dr. Quentin and Dr. Quick
(having learned of Dr. Quick’s involvement). Dr. Quick files a
dilatory exception of prematurity, arguing that because claims
against him were not reviewed pursuant to section 40:1299.47, the
action against him is premature. The court agrees, dismissing
claims against Dr. Quick without prejudice.200 Unfortunately for
Paul, the next day is the last day of the prescriptive period and he
is unable to request an MRP to review his claims against Dr.
Quick.201
Here, the operation of the narrow and broad interpretations of
LeBreton have the same effect with respect to Dr. Quick.202
Suspension of prescription was in effect against Dr. Quick while
the MRP reviewed claims against Dr. Quentin.203 However, suit
against Dr. Quentin and Dr. Quick did not interrupt prescription
against Dr. Quick. If it had, Paul would have had the benefit of
both interruption and suspension of prescription against Dr. Quick,
giving Paul and extra year to file suit after the MRP issued its
opinion.204
The above scenarios demonstrate how the narrow view of
LeBreton brings harmony to the interaction of the general rules of
prescription and the Medical Malpractice Act. It also balances the
interests of medical malpractice claimants, defendants, and the
state.

200. See LeBreton v. Rabito, 714 So. 2d 1226, 1230 (La. 1998).
201. Paul would be able to make the request, but it would be fruitless
because his claim has prescribed. If a request is made for an MRP review on a
prescribed claim, the defendant can file a peremptory exception of prescription
in any district court which must then dissolve the panel. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40:1299.47(B)(2)(a)–(b) (Supp. 2011).
202. See discussion supra Part II.A.
203. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) (Supp. 2011).
204. See LeBreton, 714 So. 2d at 1229–30; see also discussion supra Part
II.A.1.
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III. CONCLUSION
The LeBreton holding, which in its narrowest application
proscribes interruption of prescription only with respect to medical
malpractice cases before the plaintiff is notified by the MRP of its
opinion, has been expanded nearly past the point of recognition.
Thanks to Warren, neither the general rules of prescription nor
relation back of amended pleadings apply at any time during the
adjudication of a medical malpractice case. The opinion may lead
one to question whether any general codal rule of prescription
applies.
A narrow interpretation of LeBreton is in order, limiting it to its
facts. Until the barrier of uninterruptible prescription is removed,
victims of medical malpractice may remain subject to the bitter pill
of “uncertain prescription” applied in the Borel and Warren cases.
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